Rawls y responsabilidad civil: una crítica de Ripstein - Núm. 37, Diciembre 2021 - Revista Chilena de Derecho Privado - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 884304659

Rawls y responsabilidad civil: una crítica de Ripstein

AutorLeandro Martins Zanitelli
CargoAdjunct Professor at the Federal University of the State of Minas Gerais. Correo electrónico: leandrozanitelli@ufmg.br
Páginas85-104
Artículos de doctrina
85
RAWLS AND TORT LAW:
A CRITIQUE OF RIPSTEIN
RAWLS Y RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL:
UNA CRÍTICA DE RIPSTEIN
Leandro Martins Zanitelli*
ABSTRACT
The article challenges Arthur Ripstein’s theses on the place of private law
(and tort law in particular) in John Rawls’ theory of justice. According to
Ripstein, Rawls’ theory of justice grants private law a certain independence
by exempting it from the distributive injunctions of the principles chosen
in the original position. This conclusion has two bases, one negative and
the other positive. On the negative side of the argument, Ripstein claims
that Rawls’ original position does not lend itself to guiding the design of
institutions, especially those institutions with a deontological structure
such as tort law. On the positive side, Ripstein resorts to the idea of a
division of responsibility between citizens and social institutions (an idea
that Rawls presents in “Social Unity and Primary Goods”) to demonstrate
Rawls’ commitment to a pre-institutional conception of ownership and to
the independence of private law that would ensue. The article argues that
Ripstein is wrong in neglecting the role of the original position and the
principles chosen in that position and exaggerates the consequences for pri-
vate law of the division of responsibility between citizens and institutions.
KEYWORDS
: tort law; Rawls; Ripstein; distributive justice; corrective justice
RESUMEN
El artículo cuestiona las tesis de Arthur Ripstein sobre el lugar del derecho
privado (y, en particular, del derecho de daños) en la teoría de la justicia
* Adjunct Professor at the Federal University of the State of Minas Gerais. Correo
electrónico: leandrozanitelli@ufmg.br
The author thanks two anonymous reviewers of Revista Chilena de Derecho Privado for their
critiques and suggestions about an earlier version of the article. All remaining errors are mine.
Recepción: 2021-03-25; aceptación: 2021-05-17.
Revista Chilena de Derecho Privado, n.º 37, pp. 85-104 [diciembre 2021]
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86
Leandro Zanitelli RChDP n.º 37
Artículos de doctrina
de John Rawls. Según Ripstein, la teoría de la justicia de Rawls otorga al
derecho privado una cierta independencia, al no someterlo a los mandatos
distributivos de los principios elegidos en la posición original. Esta conclu-
sión tiene dos bases, una negativa y otra positiva. En el lado negativo del
argumento, Ripstein afirma que la posición original de Rawls no se presta
a guiar el diseño de instituciones, especialmente instituciones, como la
ley de responsabilidad civil, con una estructura deontológica. En el lado
positivo, Ripstein recurre a la idea de una división de responsabilidades
entre ciudadanos e instituciones sociales (idea que Rawls presenta en el
artículo Social Unity and Primary Goods) para demostrar el compromiso
de Rawls con una concepción preinstitucional de propiedad y con la
independencia del derecho privado que se derivaría. El artículo sostiene
que Ripstein se equivoca al descuidar el papel de la posición original y
los principios elegidos en esa posición, así como exagera las consecuen-
cias para el derecho privado de la división de responsabilidades entre
ciudadanos e instituciones.
PALABRAS CLAVE
: derecho de daños; Rawls; Ripstein; justicia distributiva;
justicia correctiva
INTRODUCTION
In an article published some years ago, Arthur Ripstein advocates an ori-
ginal interpretation of John Rawls’ theory of justice1. Ripstein’s attention is
focused on private law and tort law in particular. Contrary to the idea that
Rawls’ conception of justice– as fairness– would subordinate private law to
distributive objectives2, Ripstein claims that the division of responsibility
between social institutions and citizens (a division that Rawls alludes to in
“Social Unity and Primary Goods”3) implies a conception of private law
that, while not libertarian (because it is compatible with the accumulated
1 The article is “The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort”.
RIPSTEIN
(2004).
In this article, I deal exclusively with Ripstein’s analysis of the implications of Rawls’
theory of justice for private law in general and, in particular, for tort law. Therefore, I
am not concerned with more recent works, such as Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and
Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) and Private Wrongs
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), in which Ripstein develops a peculiar
conception of private law based on Kant’s Rechtslehre and without further references to
Rawls’ writings.
2 I ha ve mys elf def end ed t his ide a ov er the pas t fe w ye ars see , fo r ex amp le ,
ZANITELLI
(2019). See also
SCHEFFLER
(2015) and
FREEMAN
(2018, cap. 5).
3 Included in Collected Papers.
RAWLS
(1999a).
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