¿Puede considerarse que traer niños al mundo es contrario a sus intereses? Interpretación de la sustentación o la subrogación global de la madre entre el derecho internacional y el de la Unión Europea - Núm. 52, Enero 2019 - Revista de Derecho - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 851393114

¿Puede considerarse que traer niños al mundo es contrario a sus intereses? Interpretación de la sustentación o la subrogación global de la madre entre el derecho internacional y el de la Unión Europea

AutorDimitris Liakopoulos
CargoFull Professor of European Union Law at the Fletcher School-Tufts University (MA in international law and MA of Arts in Law and diplomacy). Full Professor of International and European Criminal and Procedural Law at the De Haagse Hogenschool-The Hague. Attorney at Law a New York and Bruxelles.
Páginas119-160
153CAN BRINGING CHILDREN INTO THE WORLD EVER BE REGARDED AS CONTRARY TO THEIR INTERESTS?...
CAN BRINGING CHILDREN INTO THE WORLD EVER BE REGARDED
AS CONTRARY TO THEIR INTERESTS? INTERPRETATION OF
SOSTITUTION OR GLOBAL MOTHERS SURROGACY BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW
[¿Puede considerarse que traer niños al mundo es contrario a sus intereses?
Interpretación de la sustentación o la subrogación global de la madre entre el
derecho internacional y el de la Unión Europea]
DIMITRIS LIAKOPOULOS*
RESUMEN ABSTRACT
El presente trabajo se concentra en
el análisis de la subrogación “global” de
acuerdo con las normas internacionales
y europeas. El proceso interpretativo que
hemos seguido nos permite pensar que
muchos valores, principios, etc., tanto a
nivel internacional, comunitario como
nacional, pueden ser contrarrestados y,
a menudo, se basan en doctrinas espe-
cializadas: temores de contaminación y,
en última instancia, de fragmentación
de sistemas nacionales de conf‌licto. En
prassi, el derecho internacional privado
y el estatus familiar en particular, no son
ontológicamente diferentes de cualquier
otro campo del derecho interno que expe-
rimente las inevitables transformaciones
debidas a la apertura a valores normativos
y desarrollos sociales internacionales y
europeos que, les guste o no. Están deter-
minados por el futuro de la subrogación
como fenómeno global.
The present work is concentrated on
the analysis of “global” surrogacy accor-
ding to international and european rules.
The interpretative process that we have
followed allows us to think that many
values, principles, and so on both at the
international, community and national
levels can be countered-and often are by
specialist doctrine-fears of contamina-
tion and, ultimately, of fragmentation of
national conf‌lict systems. In prassi, private
international law and the family status in
particular, are not ontologically different
from any other f‌ield of domestic law that
undergoes the inevitable transformations
due to the opening to international and
european normative values and social
developments that, whether they like it
or not, they are determined for the future
of subrogation as a global phenomenon.
PALABRAS CLAVE KEYWORD
Derecho Internacional de Familia –
subrogación global – protección de los
derechos humanos – interés superior del
niño – Derecho internacional privado –
Derecho de la Unión Europea – orden
público.
International Family Law – global
surrogacy – protection of human rights
– best interest of child – international
private Law – European Union Law –
public order – family Law.
RECIBIDO el 21 de octubre de 2018 y APROBADO el 3 de junio de 2019.
* Full Professor of European Union Law at the Fletcher School-Tufts University
(MA in international law and MA of Arts in Law and diplomacy). Full Professor
of International and European Criminal and Procedural Law at the De Haagse
Hogenschool-The Hague. Attorney at Law a New York and Bruxelles. ORCID ID:
0000-0002-1048-6468.
Revista de Derecho
de la Pontif‌icia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso
52 (primer semestre de 2019)
[pp. 153 - 194]
DIMITRIS LIAKOPOULOS154 REVISTA DE DERECHO 51 (SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2018)
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of surrogate motherhood arises within the
controversial issue of medically assisted procreation whose techniques are
also used to realize the various hypotheses of maternal subrogation, so-
called gestational1. We speak of surrogate motherhood when a woman,
under payment or for free, makes available her uterus for a couple who
can not have children because of the physical impossibility of the woman
of the couple herself to carry out a pregnancy, and who commits himself
to be artif‌icially fertilized2 with the seed of the man of the couple or of
an external donor3 to it, to complete the pregnancy and f‌inally to hand
over the child so conceived to the clients. The surrogate motherhood
must be distinguished from the rent of the uterus4, another practice often
1 FRONEK, Patricia – CRAWSHAW, Marilyn, The “new family” as an emerging norm:
A commentary on the position of social work in assisted reproduction, en British Journal
of Social Work 44 (2014), 2. DAVIS, Erica, The rise of gestational surrogacy and the
pressing need for international regulation, en Minnesota Journal of International Law
21 (2012), pp. 122 ss (“describing other forms of unavailability regarding particular
procedures or processes, namely sex selection and binding contractual surrogacy
agreements [...] forum shopping has also been facilitated by the differences among
jurisdictions’ legal and policy approaches to surrogacy [...]”). BRUGGER, Kristiana,
International law in the gestational surrogacy debate, en Fordham International Law
Journal 35 (2012), pp. 668 ss (discussing the risk of exploitation and continuation of
gender hierarchies proliferated by the international commercial surrogacy industry).
HERMAN, Amanda, The regulation of gestation: A call for more complete State Statutory
Regulation of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, en Chapman Law Review 18 (2015),
pp. 556 ss. SUTER, Sonia, Giving in to baby markets: Regulation without prohibition,
en Michigan Journal of Gender & Law 16 (2009), pp. 218 ss (“... we potentially
do harm to ourselves and to human f‌lourishing if we treat something integral to
ourselves as a commodity, that is, as separate and fungible [...]”). NELSON, Erin,
Global trade and assisted reproductive technologies: Regulatory challenges in international
surrogacy, en The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 41 (2013), 1, pp. 242 ss. WADE,
Katherine, The regulation of surrogacy: A children’s rights perspective, en Child Family
Law 29 (2017), 2, pp. 115 ss. MONÉGER, Françoise, Gestation pour autrui: Surrogate
motherhood (Paris, Société de Législation Comparée, 2011). SUCKER, Stefanie, To
recognize or not to recognize? That is the question!, en European Journal of Law Reform
17 (2015), 2, pp. 258 ss.
2 MÜLL-GÖTZMANN, Christian, Artif‌izielle Reproduktion und gleichgeschlechtliche
Elternschaft (Heidelberg, Springer, 2009), pp. 236 ss.
3 CLARK, Brigitte, A balancing act? The rights of donor-conceived children to know
their biological origins, en Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 30
(2012), 3, pp. 620 ss. S. GOLOMBOK, Families created by reproductive donation,
(2013) 7 in Child Development Perspectives, 7, 2013, pp. 62ss.
4 MORTAZAVI, Susan, It takes a village to make a child: Creating guidelines for
155CAN BRINGING CHILDREN INTO THE WORLD EVER BE REGARDED AS CONTRARY TO THEIR INTERESTS?...
assimilated or confused with the f‌irst but which, in reality, represents
a completely different type of carrying out the pregnancy on behalf of
others. Instead, with the rent of the uterus, in fact, reference is made to
the practice with which the woman “commissioned” by the couple is
limited to carrying on the pregnancy with the use of genetic material5 that
is entirely coming from the same clients or possibly from other donors6.
The national regulatory choices at the world level are increasingly
destined to confront the respect of the fundamental rights of individuals
as def‌ined by sources and jurisdictions outside the forum. This leads in
some cases to delicate problems of harmonization between internal and
international norms (and underlying values)7.
international surrogacy, en Georgetown Law Journal 101 (2012), pp. 2272 ss.
5 PENNINGS, Guido – VAYENA, Efy – AHUJA, Kamal, Balancing ethical criteria
for the recruitment of gamete donors, in RICHARDS, M. – PENNINGS, G. – APPLEBY,
J., Reproductive donation: Practice, policy and bioethics (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp. 154 ss.
6 DE VERDA Y BEAMONTE, José Ramón, Reprodución humana asistida, en Revista
Boliviana de Derecho 7 (2009), pp. 207 ss.
7 See in argument from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) the
next cases which employed the term “commissioning mother” instead of “intended
mother”: C-167712, C.D. v. S.T. of 18 March 2014, ECLI:EUC:2014:169, in
electronic Reports of cases; C-402/05 P and C-4015/05 P, joined cases, Yassar
Abdulla Kadi & Al Bakaraat International Foundation & Council of the European
Union and European Commission, of 3 September 2008, ECLI:E:C:2008:461, ECR
I-06351; C-363/12, Z. v. A Government Department and the Board of Management of
a Community School of 18 March 2014, ECLI:EUC:2014:159, in electronic Reports of
cases. The Advocate General Nils Wahl distinguished the case: “(...) the situation of
a pregnant worker falling under the scope of the Pregnant Workers Directive which
provides for maternity leave of at least 14 weeks in order for a woman to recover
from childbirth and take care (...) to equate her situation with that of either a woman
who has given birth, or an adoptive mother (...)”; C-167/12, C.D. v. S.T of 18 March
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:169, in electronic Reports of cases. The Advocate General
Kokott said that: “(...) an intended mother who has a baby through a surrogacy
arrangement has the right to receive maternity leave provided for under EU law (...)
that maternity leave which the surrogate mother has taken must be deducted from
the leave of the intended mother. In any case, the leave of the intended mother must
amount to at least two weeks. Both the surrogate mother and the intended mother
must be given at least two weeks of paid leave each, Kokott said. The remaining 10
weeks of the EU’s required 14 must be shared between the two, taking into account
the protection of “the woman who has recently given birth and the child’s best
interests (...). In these case not the intended mother, but the surrogate mother gave
birth to the child. Legislation on surrogacy varies greatly in the member states of the
EU. In some member states, surrogacy is legally regulated (for example in Austria,
Finland and Sweden). The CJEU interpreted both Directives 92/85 and 2006/54 in
the C.D. and Z. cases. The question whether the prohibition of discrimination on

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